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tion of gas pipeline right-of-way easements have also been decided. So far
the Internal Revenue Service has lost on the merits in all three cases. In
these cases the courts have consistently held that all that is required is a
"reasonable approximation" or "rough estimate" of the length of useful
life of an asset for the taxpayer to be allowed a depreciation deduction.4
Nevertheless, the Revenue Service has persisted in maintaining that an
estimation or approximation was insufficient to comply with the require-
ment of "reasonable accuracy." It appears that final settlement of the
controversy as to where the line is to be drawn must await either a decision
by the Supreme Court or a change in the regulations by the Treasury. In
the meantime, the taxpayer has three decisions in his favor. It makes little
sense for the Revenue Service to continue to refuse to allow any deprecia-
tion and distort the taxpayer's income merely because he cannot compute
the useful life of the rights-of-way with mathematical precision.
As suggested above, perhaps the problem could be resolved easily by
recognizing that the rights-of-way are not intangibles at all, but tangibles,
merging with the construction cost, line pipe and other equipment to be-
come one indivisible and inseverable pipeline system. The Revenue Service
has recognized that certain expenditures, intangible when viewed individ-
ually, become merged into the cost of the tangible asset to which they are
related and are depreciable or depletable. For example, intangible drilling
costs incurred in drilling an oil well are expensed or capitalized at the elec-
tion of the taxpayer." Other examples are attorneys' fees and architect,
engineering and contractor's fees incurred in the construction of a tan-
gible asset. If the rights-of-way were characterized as tangibles then proof
of the useful life of the related pipeline would be far easier.
The importance of Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. United States is that its ul-
timate decision, after appeal, will have a tremendous impact on the oil
pipeline and related industries. In fact, presently, there are some twenty-
one cases pending in the court of claims and the United States district
courts on this very issue. It remains to be seen whether the holding in
Shell-that the primary trunk line rights-of-way costs incurred by an oil
pipeline common carrier are depreciable because such assets have a limited
useful life which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy-will stand
on appeal.
Robert M. Bandy
Federal Estate Tax - Fixed Monthly Payments to
Surviving Spouse Qualify for the Marital Deduction
Decedent's will set up a trust from which his widow was to be paid a
"'See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1960); Shell Pipe Line
Corp. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp.
v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1966).
"Treas. Reg. 1.612-4 (1965).
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fixed sum of money each month.1 The widow was also given the power to
appoint the entire trust corpus. On decedent's estate tax return, his execu-
tor claimed that a portion of the trust was deductible from the gross estate
under section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. That
section permits a deduction in respect to a property interest passing from
a deceased husband to his widow,a if the widow "is entitled for life to all
the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific por-
tion thereof ... with power ... to appoint the entire interest, or such spe-
cific portion . . . ." The executor contended that the dollar amount of cor-
pus needed to produce, each month, a sum of money equal to the widow's
stipend could be determined by actuarial computation He argued that
this computed dollar amount was a "specific portion" within the purview
of section 2056 (b) (5). However, the Commissioner refused to allow a de -
duction because the claimed "specific portion" was a fixed sum rather than
a "fractional or percentile share" of the entire trust, as required by the
Treasury Regulations.! The Third Circuit,7 reversing the district court,'
agreed with the Commissioner. Because this decision conflicted with a Sev-
enth Circuit case,' the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed: A
bequest in trust, providing for the monthly payment to decedent's widow
of a fixed dollar amount, qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction un-
der section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. North-
eastern Pennsylvania National Bank &Y Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S.
213 (1967).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SPECIFIC PORTION" CONCEPT
The marital deduction was created by the Revenue Act of 1948.1' The
object of that legislation was to "equalize the effect of estate taxes in com-
munity property and common-law jurisdictions."11 In a community prop-
' The widow was to receive $300 per month until decedent's youngest child reached eighteen,
and $350 per month thereafter. If the trust income was insufficient to meet the payments, corpus
could be invaded to make up the difference. If the income exceeded the amount to be paid, the
excess was to be accumulated.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
'The terms "husband" and "widow" are used for sake of convenience. All remarks should be
read as applicable to either spouse.
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1954,§ 2056(b)(5).
:The executor contended that, because corpus could be invaded to meet the monthly payments
(see supra note 1), the widow's monthly stipend was, in effect, an annuity. Brief for Petitioner, at
19, Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967). Hence, he
proposed that the "specific portion" be computed using the prescribed Treasury formula for
annuity-valuation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958). Though the district court had accepted this
approach, the Supreme Court rejected it as "incorrect," Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, supra at 225, presumably because the court felt that, under the language of
§ 2056(b) (5), a "specific portion" could only be the dollar amount of corpus which would pro-
duce an income equal to the widow's monthly stipend. The number of years the stipend is to be
paid is irrelevant.
6Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
'Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
'Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
9Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966), discussed infra, text
accompanying notes 31 and 32.
'"Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 5 361(a), 62 Stat. 117 (1948).
"1 United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963). See also Dougherty v. United States, 292
F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1958).
The deduction is from the deeedent's "adjusted gross estate."
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erty state the wife is considered the fee simple owner of one-half of the
community wealth. Thus, when the husband dies only his portion of the
estate is taxed. Taxation of the wife's one-half is deferred until her death.
The marital deduction was an attempt to place the common law testator on
a par with his community property counterpart by allowing him to trans-
fer up to one-half of his adjusted gross estate 2 to his widow free from
estate taxes.
At the time the marital deduction was enacted, Congress realized that
perfect geographic tax equality could not be achieved because of the in-
herent differences between community and separate property." However,
Congress was also aware that an approximation of equality could best be
accomplished by limiting property interests which qualified for the marital
deduction to those of a fee simple quality.'4 If a property interest of less
than fee quality (e.g., a trust) is permitted to qualify for the deduction,
common law residents will enjoy a "qualitative advantage" over com-
munity property inhabitants. The advantage is in the amount of control
the deceased husband can exert over his widow's interest. A community
property widow takes her share of the estate in fee simple. Thus, her de-
ceased husband cannot influence her use and enjoyment of the property
through his will or by any other means." The settlor of a trust, on the
other hand, can exert a good deal of control over his widow's interest.
However, Congress did not wish to prejudice the prudent disposition of
property by trust in common law states;'" therefore it provided, in the
Revenue Act of 1948, that bequests in trust could, under certain condi-
tions, qualify for the marital deduction. To reduce to a minimum the
qualitative advantage generated by the inclusion of trusts, Congress im-
posed the dual requirements that the widow have the sole right to all the
income from the trust, and the sole power to appoint the entire corpus.
These requirements insured that a testator who passed an interest to his
widow by "marital deduction trust" gave her virtually all the rights of a
fee simple owner in respect to that interest.
Unfortunately, the wording of the 1948 provision produced some un-
desired results. The courts construed the requirements that the widow re-
ceive all the income from the trust and have power to appoint the entire
corpus to mean that a bequest granting anything less did not qualify for
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(c)(1). For an enumeration of items included in the ad-
justed gross estate, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-I (b) (1958).
"aSee, e.g., S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1948); Anderson, The
Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common
Law and Community Property States, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1956).
14S. REs'. No. 1013, supra note 13, pt. 1, at 28. There it was said: "[T]he interest in property
must pass outright to the surviving . . . spouse to qualify for the marital deduction. . . . This
will equate the decedent in the common-law State with the decedent in the community property
State who cannot by his will effect [sic] in any way the surviving spouse's interest in the com-
munity property."
"S A community property husband may control, to some extent, his widow's use of the property
through the "widow's election." Under this device, the husband bequeathes the widow a life estate
in all the community property, with a remainder to the children. The widow may then elect to
take the life estate or to take her one-half community interest in fee simple. Of course, the hus-
band's ability to control the widow's interest is contingent on her election. See Comment, The
Widow's Election-A Study in Three Parts, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 134 (1961).16S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 13, pt. 1, at 28.
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the marital deduction." Thus, a testator who wished to provide for more
than one person and still qualify for the marital deduction had to establish
multiple trusts. To remove this needless burden, Congress revised the mari-
tal deduction provision in 1954 to permit the qualification of a "specific
portion" of a trust, if the widow had sole income rights from, and a sole
power of appointment over, that portion.
II. THE "SPECIFIC PORTION" ENIGMA
A definition of "specific portion" was not included in the 1954 legisla-
tion. Moreover, the Senate and House Committee reports on the subject
were likewise devoid of any clear-cut explanation. The meaning of the
term was thus left open to speculation. It was immediately apparent that
a property interest of a nature somewhat different from a fee simple-a
fixed dollar amount-could arguably fall within the wording of the new
provision, section 2056(b) (5). If a fixed "specific portion" could qualify
for the marital deduction, the qualitative advantage of common law resi-
dents would be increased: the owner of a fee simple, e.g., a community
property widow, faces the possibility that a declining market may dissi-
pate the value of her interest. The holder of a fixed interest faces no such
risk. This disparity can be demonstrated by the following example: Assume
a trust, at the time of the husband's death, contains $2,000, and the hus-
band's will gives his widow income rights over a fixed $1,000 and appoint-
ment power over the entire trust."8 A depreciation in the trust corpus to
$1,500 does not infringe on the widow's right to income from $1,000.
Under similar circumstances in a community property state, the widow's
community one-half interest would decline to $750. If the value of the
property interest appreciates the situation is reversed, but in both cases the
widow having a fixed "specific portion" is insulated from one of the chief
incidents of a fee simple, the risk of the market.
With the foregoing facts in mind, the Commissioner sought to formu-
late a definition of "specific portion" which would not alter the nature of
property interests which qualified for the marital deduction. He issued a
Regulation" stating that a "specific portion" had to be expressed as a frac-
tional or percentile share of the entire trust in order to qualify. Under this
definition, the interest which the widow received would continue to bear
a proportionate share of the market risk. For instance, a widow given
income rights over one-third of a trust and appointment power over the
entire corpus would get one-third of the total income produced regardless
of variations in the value of the corpus. However, whether the Commis-
sioner's definition best effectuates the congressional policy of geographic
tax equality is a question on which courts have not agreed.
'
7 See, e.g., Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1024 (1957); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 878 (1956). See also S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 240-41 (1958).
" The widow's income rights and appointment power need not be coextensive. Gelb v. Com-
missioner, 298 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1962). However, since both are necessary to qualify a
"specific portion" of a trust for the marital deduction, the smaller of the two necessarily controls
the size of the "specific portion."
9 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
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III. THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
The "fractional or percentile" definition has been tested in three lead-
ing circuit court cases. Though all three courts rejected the restrictive
bounds of the Regulation, they did not agree as to what constitutes a "spe-
cific portion." The pathfinder in the realm of "specific portion" was a
1962 case, Gelb v. Commissioner." There a widow was granted the right to
all the income from a trust, and the power to appoint the entire corpus.
However, the trustee was given the power to invade corpus up to $5,000
per year for the benefit of testator's child. Because of the trustee's power,'
the entire trust could not qualify for the marital deduction. The widow
nevertheless contended that a "specific portion" of the trust, namely, that
amount of corpus which was not subject to the trustee's raiding power,
met the marital deduction requirements of section 2056 (b) (5). She urged
that the court compute by actuarial formula the maximum amount of
corpus which the trustee could withdraw," subtract this amount from
the value of the entire corpus, and treat the remainder as a "specific por-
tion" over which she had sole income rights and appointment power.
In the Commissioner's view, the widow's interest was not a "specific
portion" because it was not expressed in fractional terms" and thus did not
bear a proportionate share of the market risk. In fact, the widow's portion
was subject to all the market risk, because it fluctuated while the non-
qualifying part was a fixed sum. But the Second Circuit was not per-
suaded by the Commissioner's argument that Congress had intended to
limit the interests which could qualify for the marital deduction to those
akin to a fee simple.' Thus, the court disapproved the "fractional or per-
centile" Regulation and granted the deduction, finding that Congress had
"nowhere indicated any policy that the deductibility of a 'specific portion'
should be governed by the possibility that the spouse's portion will change
in value relatively more or less than the clearly non-qualifying part.""
Since the widow's interest in Gelb was subject to market fluctuation, its
qualification as a "specific portion" produced no increase in the qualitative
advantage of common law residents. However, a more difficult question
was presented by the instant case, Northeastern Pennsylvania National
Bank &q Trust Co. v. United States," and the virtually identical Citizens
National Bank v. United States." These two cases involved claims for
marital deductions on actuarily computed "specific portions" which were
fixed dollar amounts. As previously noted, a fixed "specific portion" is an
interest not at all similar to a fractional share or a fee simple, and its quali-
fication for the marital deduction would increase the qualitative advantage
20 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
21 The widow did not have the sole power to appoint the entire trust corpus, as required by
§ 2056(b)(5).
22 Computed as $5000 times the combined life expectancies of the widow and child.
"a The term "fractional" is hereafter used to signify either a fractional share or a percentile
share of a trust.
24See infra, text accompanying notes 34-37.
"5Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551 (2d Cir. 1962).
26 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
27359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966).
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of common law residents. Thus, the issue was squarely presented: Did
section 2056(b) (5), when it altered the marital deduction provisions to
permit a qualifying "specific portion," expand the class of qualified inter-
ests to include those bearing no market risk?
The Northeastern and Citizens courts disagreed on the answer to this
question. The Seventh Circuit, which heard the Citizens case, rejected the
"fractional or percentile" Regulation, and ruled that the widow's interest
was a "specific portion" within the meaning of section 2056(b) (5)." The
court cited Gelb as controlling the question of congressional intent under-
lying the marital deduction. Congress had intended to equalize estate taxes
by making the marital deduction readily available to common law resi-
dents. Thus, in the absence of any restrictive language in the marital de-
duction provisions, "specific portion" should be liberally construed to in-
clude a fixed dollar amount. The court then approved the calculation of
the deductible "specific portion" as the dollar amount of corpus required
to produce, at three and one-half per cent, a monthly income equal to the
widow's stipend.
In Northeastern the Third Circuit disagreed with the interpretation of
legislative history espoused in Gelb and Citizens, and ruled that the widow's
interest was not a "specific portion." That court did not, however, hold
that an interest in trust had to meet the "fractional or percentile" test to
qualify for the deduction. Perhaps with a view toward Gelb-type situa-
tions, where there is no fractional share but the interest is nevertheless sub-
ject to market fluctuation, the Third Circuit formulated a "virtual owner"2
test. The court reviewed the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1948
and concluded that Congress had intended, in the interest of geographic
tax equality, to restrict the marital deduction to instances where the widow
was granted the equivalent of a fee simple.' One of the rights of a fee
simple owner, implied the court, was the right to all the income from his
interest. Therefore, a marital deduction should not be allowed on an ac-
tuarially computed "specific portion" unless the computation used "suc-
ceeds in isolating that part of the corpus from which the survivor is en-
titled to all the income from her lifetime . . .. '
The court then noted that the only computation which could isolate a
"specific portion" from which the widow was entitled to all the income
was one which took into account the maximum income which could be
produced by the corpus in a given month. The "specific portion" could
then be computed as the ratio between the maximum income potential of
the corpus, for instance, $500, and the amount required to be paid to the
widow each month, $300, or three-fifths. However, the court felt that this
computation could not be made because the maximum income potential of
218 1d. at 820.
29 363 F.2d at 480, quoting S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 13, pt. 2, at 16.
" The court relied on the statement that the marital deduction would be available "where the
surviving spouse, by reason of her right to the income and a power of appointment, is the virtual
owner of the property." S. Rep. No. 1013, pt. 2, supra note 13, at 16.
" Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 476, 481 (3d Cir.
1966).
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the corpus was not known and could not be accurately estimated,". and
thus denied the claimed deduction.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The conflicting circuit court decisions merely added to the confusion
surrounding the definition of "specific portion." The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Northeastern in order to clear up this uncertainty.
After a close look at the legislative histories of both the 1948 and 1954
marital deduction provisions, the court concluded that the Gelb and Citi-
zens courts had correctly determined congressional intent in regard to the
marital deduction. Congress had intended, said Justice Fortas' majority
opinion, to equalize the geographic effect of estate taxes by affording "a
liberal 'estate-splitting' possibility to married couples.""8 Thus "specific por-
tion" should be liberally defined to include an actuarially computed, fixed
dollar amount of corpus.
The Court found a liberal intent primarily because there was no express-
ly restrictive language in the legislative histories of either the 1948 or the
1954 provisions.' Although the Commissioner insisted that a phrase"3
found in a Senate Finance Committee Report' on the 1948 Act indicated
that Congress had intended the marital deduction to apply only where the
widow was the "virtual owner""7 of her interest, the Court dismissed that
language as "irrelevant"3 When considered in context. Congress' concern,
said the Court, was to insure that the widow had all the rights of a fee
simple owner, i.e., the sole right to income and the sole power to appoint,
and not to require that the interest itself be the equivalent of a fee simple.
Thus, the Supreme Court repudiated the Third Circuit's "virtual owner"
test, stating: "Obviously, Congress did not intend the deduction to be
available only with respect to interests equivalent to outright ownership,
or trusts would not have been permitted to qualify at all."'
The Court next discussed the feasibility of a computed "specific portion."
The Third Circuit had objected to computation because the lack of real
'- The Court's objection to the use of assumed, "reasonable" income factors to compute an
estimated maximum income potential seemed to be that this computation would not result in a
"specific portion" from which the widow was certain to receive all the income, as required by
section 2056(b) (5). The Court noted that, if a "specific portion" was computed using an assumed
investment constant, say 3 and /2 percent, excess income would be produced from this portion
whenever the real market rate of return exceeded the assumed rate. The widow would not be en-
titled to this excess, because under the terms of the will it would have to be accumulated. This
objection overlooks the fact that qualification for the marital deduction is determined only at the
time of decedent's death, with no inquiry into possible subsequent changes in circumstances. Jack-
son v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
as Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 218 (1967).3 4 H.R. REp. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), and S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954), contain no mention of a "fractional or percentile" requirement. The Court was
further impressed by the fact that the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 93, 72 Stat. 1668
(1958) makes "The more realistic rules of the 1954 Code" apply retroactively to the 1948 marital
deduction.
as The phrase was that which the circuit court had earlier relied on in denying the deduction.
See supra note 29.
*S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 13, at 28.
31id. at 16.




investment constants made accurate estimation of the maximum income
potential of the corpus impossible. The Supreme Court disagreed. Though
admitting that perfect projection of future rates of return was not pos-
sible, the court concluded that an acceptable specific portion could be esti-
mated by using reasonable market conditions to compute the maximum in-
come potential of the corpus. However, the court did not specify a formula
for computation, but remanded for such a determination.
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's determina-
tion of congressional intent. He felt that the "liberalism"4 which the ma-
jority had injected into the marital deduction would not only prove trou-
blesome to estate planners, whose profession demands predictability, but
also would lead to a "tax avoidance scheme" 4' for common law residents.
The latter conclusion was based on the language of section 2056(b) (5).
Justice Stewart noted that the provision reads: "[The widow must receive]
all the income from a specific portion . . .with power . . .to appoint ...
such portion."' From this, he deduced that if the widow's rights to income
could be expressed in fixed terms, it followed that her power of appoint-
ment could be likewise stated. In such a case, since it is the widow's power
of appointment which controls the amount taxable to her estate,43 an in-
crease in the value of the corpus could result in tax avoidance by common
law residents.
To illustrate his point, Justice Stewart gave the example of a $200,000
trust, with the widow having income rights and a power of appointment
over a fixed $100,000, and the testator's children having income rights
from the residue, their remainders to vest when the widow dies. If at the
time of the widow's death the corpus has increased to $400,000, only the
amount which the widow can appoint, $100,000, is taxable to her estate.
The remaining $300,000 passes tax free to the children. Under the same
circumstances in a community property state, the widow's 50 percent
community interest would make $200,000 of the expanded corpus taxable
to her estate, and only $200,000 would pass tax free to the children. This
"quantitative advantage" could be avoided, Justice Stewart felt, only by
restricting "specific portion" to a fractional or percentile share of the trust.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress intended to create a lib-
eral, readily available, marital deduction represents a contrast to the well
accepted principle that tax deductions are to be strictly construed.4 ,
Moreover, the Northeastern decision overlooks the fact that the overriding
purpose of the marital deduction provision, regardless of whether Congress
intended that it be liberally construed, was to equalize the tax discrepancies
in the two jurisdictions.' Northeastern does not equalize. The case grants
40 id. at 229.
41 Id. at 227.4 21 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2056(b)(s).
4
3Id. § 2041.
"Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1024
(1957). See also, 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1157, at 965.
45 See supra note 11.
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a "qualitative advantage" to common law residents, for it allows a
common law decedent greater control over his surviving spouse's interest
(by fixing the amount which she can receive each month), as well as in-
sulating the spouse from market risk.
The Court's position that the enactment of the marital deduction with
certain inequality "built-into the statute"4 shows that Congress did not
intend to restrict qualified interests to those akin to a fee simple seems un-
tenable. The marital deduction trust was conceived as a delicate compro-
mise between the purpose of geographic tax equality and a recognized need
for the continued availability of the trust as a means of disposing of pro-
perty. Congress balanced these two interests in setting out the requirements
for the marital deduction trust in 1948. Implicit in the requirements was
that the widow's interest be subject to the risk of the market. The legis-
lative history of the 1954 revisions of the marital deduction reveals only
an intent to remove an unforeseen complication resulting from the re-
quirements that the widow receive all the income from the trust and be em-
powered to appoint the entire corpus. There is no indication of a congres-
sional desire to change the nature of interests qualified for the marital de-
duction. In the absence of a specific command from the 1954 Congress, the
Supreme Court should not have abandoned the implied requirement of
market risk.
Justice Stewart's dissent levels a more serious charge at Northeastern,
the charge that it will lead to a quantitative advantage for common law
residents. Under the facts set out in his example,47 this is certainly true.
However, if, in the example, the corpus of the trust had decreased rather
than increased, the community property residents would have paid the
lesser tax. 8 This suggests that the real advantage offered common law resi-
dents by Northeastern (if Justice Stewart is correct that it will allow the
widow's power of appointment to be fixed) is not the certain escape of
taxes but the choice of whether to fix the widow's appointment power. A
common law resident can speculate as to whether the market will rise or
fall, and give his widow either a fixed specific portion or a fractional share
according to his speculation. If he thinks the value of the corpus is likely
to increase, he can fix his widow's "specific portion" and the estate will
reap the benefits noted in Justice Stewart's example. If, on the other hand,
the corpus is likely to decrease in size, the common law testator can give
his widow the power to appoint a fractional share and receive the same tax
treatment afforded community property residents.
Whether Justice Stewart is correct in that Northeastern will allow the
widow's power of appointment to be expressed in fixed terms remains to
be seen. The majority hinted that it might not, stating that the "specific
portion" determined by the power of appointment involved a "quite dif-
' See Comment, Qualification of a Specific Portion of a Trust for the Marital Deduction, 19
STAN. L.R. 468, 473 (1967).
4 See supra text accompanying note 42.
48 If the corpus had decreased to $150,000 at the time of the widow's death, her estate would
still be taxed on the amount which she appointed, $100,000. A community property widow's
estate would be taxed on only one-half of $150,000, or $75,000.
1968 ]
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ferent question" 9 than the "specific portion" determined by income rights.
This statement hardly removes the uncertainty as to what constitutes a
"specific portion." This question should be settled quickly, and preferably
settled by a ruling that the widow's appointment power cannot be stated
in fixed terms.
Lawrence D. Stuart, Jr.
Oil and Gas Lessee's Right To Use Surface Owner's
Fresh Water Supply for Waterflooding
Waterflooding, as a device for secondary recovery and pressure main-
tenance operations on oil leases, has become a fairly widespread and sig-
nificant technique in recent years.' Not only is the increased production
obtained by the process of value to the lessee and the royalty owner, but
the public in general also benefits because less oil is left unrecoverable in
the ground. However, these benefits do not always flow without their
price. Although most waterflooding operations now conducted in Texas
utilize salt water to increase pressure in the producing reservoir, technical
problems in some areas require or encourage oil companies to inject fresh
water rather than salt water in their waterflood projects. Where fresh water
is abundant, its use for waterflooding creates few problems; but in many
areas, such as West Texas, fresh water is a scarce, depleting asset, and
waterflooding operations only add another burden to a water supply al-
ready overburdened by irrigation, municipal, and other demands.
I. SUN OIL Co. v. WHITAKER'
In 1967 the first Texas case dealing with an oil company's right to use
fresh water for waterflooding reached the appellate courts. The dispute
arose on a tract of land in Hockley County which Sun Oil Company had
leased from L. D. Gann in 1947. The defendant, Earnest Whitaker, owned
title to the surface of this tract through a 1948 conveyance to him of
Gann's retained title to the surface. Since the late 1940's the tract has been
producing oil, but in 1965 Sun decided to begin waterflooding operations.
The Texas Railroad Commission granted a permit for this purpose, spe-
cifically authorizing Sun to inject fresh water from the Ogallala forma-
tion.' The Ogallala, the only source of fresh water on the land, also con-
"'Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 227 n.2 (1967).
'Oil in its normal state under the ground is under pressure from some source, usually gas or
salt water. When the oil reservoir is tapped by a well, this pressure pushes the oil toward the hole.
Invariably, some of this pressure is lost as oil is produced, and after a period of time the pressure
in the reservoir becomes so low that the oil is no longer pushed to the well. In order to prevent
this decline in pressure, oil producers pump some substance into the reservoir from other wells.
If this operation is conducted carefully, the remaining oil in the reservoir will be pushed ahead
of the injected substance toward the producing well. "Waterflooding" refers to the injection of
fresh or salt water for these operations, although gas is also suitable. For a layman's discussion of
the engineering aspects of oil production, see INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM'N, OIL AND GAS
PRODUCTION (1951).
2412 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 424 S.W.2d 216 (Tex.
1968). See also Flittie, Oil and Gas, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 106, 107 (1968).
'Water in the Ogallala formation is subject to depletion just like oil and gas. See United
States v. Shurbet, 347 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1965).
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